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What Cognitive Psychology 
Can (and Can not) Do for Test 
Development 
Robert J. Sternberg 
Yale University 
Whenever research is launched under a new paradigm for studying an old set of 
mental phenomena, researchers joining the new armada of explorers hope, at 
best, to discover new uncharted mental territories and, at worst, to provide new 
mental maps of previously charted territories that amend errors of the old maps. 
This has been I believe, the experience of cognitive psychologists studying 
mental abilities . Although they may not have revolutionized our map of the mind 
(yet), neither have they left the old maps standing. What is critical is that at least 
the flaws and incompletenesses of the new methods are different from those of 
the old . One can therefore be provided with some new insights about the mental 
phenomena being studied. Consider an analogy to polar and Cartesian coordi-
nates: Each provides a different and useful view of a world that is not quite so 
simple as either coordinate system would have us believe. Seeing the mental 
world in two ways can tell us more than seeing it in just one way. In the language 
of Gamer, Hake, and Eriksen (1956), we have provided "converging opera-
tions" to view a unitary phenomenon. 
I have divided my analysis of the contribution of cognitive psychology to test 
construction into four main parts dealing, respectively, with the contributions of 
cognitive psychology to: (1) content for construction of tests; (2) validation of 
tests; (3) scoring and interpretation of tests; and (4) modification of tests . Before 
discussing these contributions , however, let me say just what are the characteris-
tics that define "cognitive psychology" and what psychologists do in the cogni-
tive-psychological investigation of intelligence. 
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WHAT IS COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY? 
Cognitive psychology is the study of the mind in terms of the mental (cognitive) 
representations and processes that underlie observable behavior. In particular , I 
find that cognitive researchers tend to address five main questions: 
I . What are the mental processes that constitute intelligent task performance? 
2. How rapidly and accurately are these processes performed? 
3. Into what strategies for task performance do these mental processes 
combine? 
4 . Upon what forms of mental representation do these processes and strat-
egies act? 
5. What is the knowledge base that is organized into these forms of represen-
tation , and how does it affect and become affected by the processes , strategies, 
and representations that individuals use? 
These questions have been asked of performance on a rather wide range of 
cognitive tasks. 
Cognitive Versus Psychometric Approaches 
The cognitive approach is often contrasted with the psychometric one, perhaps 
because historically it has seemed easy enough to separate the psychometricians 
of a given time from the experimental psychologists of that time (many of whom 
now call themselves "cognitive" psychologists) . However , I think it worth 
mentioning and even emphasizing that the distinction has never been as clear as 
Cronbach's (1957) paper on "the two disciplines of scientific psychology" or as 
the conventional wisdom (which may in part be based upon Cronbach's paper) 
might have one believe. Many of the great experimental or "cognitive" psychol-
ogists in the history of psychology have also been psychometricians and vice 
versa, and it often seems almost arbitrary to identify a given individual as one or 
the other. Consider some examples. 
Sir Francis Galton invented the correlational method and yet was an av id 
experimentalist. Alfred Binet invented the prototype for the most widely used 
psychometric intelligence test, and yet a close reading of his writings will show 
his often neglected theorizing to be as "cognitive" as any we find today. Charles 
Spearman invented factor analysis, and yet his 1923 treatise on the "principles 
of cognition" was a cognitive monograph and the basis for much cognitive 
theorizing today, particularly in the domain of inductive reasoning. Edward 
Thorndike is most well known for his experimental work in animal learning and 
yet was the author of a major book on the subject of psychometrically measured 
intelligence. Clark Hull, another famous learning theorist, wrote his first book on 
the subject of aptitude testing. Louis Thurstone, a psychometrician if ever there 
was one , advocated factorial methods as preliminaries to experimental ones, not 
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as replacements for them. Finally, J . P. Guilford, clearly identified as a psycho-
metrician, has also proposed a theory of intelligence in which one of the three 
facets describes the processes of intelligence. 
The list could go on and on, but I think the point by now should be clear: Even 
before Cronbach' s (1957) paper, there was already a substantial connection 
between psychometric and cognitive lines of endeavor. I do not believe they 
were ever quite so separate as Cronbach's paper suggested, and for all the 
overwhelming positive contribution the paper clearly made, it may have served 
the slightly negative function of tending to underscore the points of friction rather 
than the points of smooth contact. Today, I believe (in part because of the 
positive contribution of Cronbach's paper) that the distinction between psycho-
metricians and cognitive psychologists, at least in the research domain of intel-
ligence, is fuzzier than ever. People like Jack Carroll, Earl Hunt , Robert Glaser, 
Susan Whitely, Richard Snow, and myself, among others, could perhaps as 
easily be classified as falling into one camp as into the other. 
If the line between psychometrics and cognitive psychology is so unclear, just 
what is it that is distinctive about the cognitive approach? Certainly it is not just 
the questions asked , in that the questions listed earlier would also be quite 
relevant to the interest of many psychometricians theorizing about intelligence. 
Nor is it, really , the emphasis of the questions upon stimulus rather than subject 
variation. Psychometric methods, like factor analysis, really can be used to study 
either source of variation (although they are most commonly used to study 
subject variation) , and experimental methods can also be used to study either 
stimulus or subject variation (although they are most commonly used to study 
stimulus variation). 
The critical difference, I believe, is a sociological one and resides primarily 
(but not exclusively) in the professional identification of the investigator and of 
the methods he or she uses. A number of contemporary investigators, including 
this author, use multiple regression in modeling of test performance; for what-
ever reason , this methodology today seems more to belong to the "cognitive 
camp," despite the fact that multiple regression can certainly be and has been 
viewed as a psychometric method. Susan Whitely does a highly similar (although 
by no means identical) kind of modeling using latent-trait analysis and tends to 
be viewed more in the psychometric camp. Users of exploratory factor analysis, 
like Raymond Cattell and John Horn , tend to be identified with the psychometric 
camp, whereas users of confirmatory factor analysis, like Carl and John 
Frederiksen, tend more to be identified with the experimental camp. The lines 
between camps are certainly not clearly drawn, although they can be inferred to 
some extent by the conventions one attends and by the journals in which one 
publishes as well as by the methods one uses . The rationale for placing someone 
in one or the other camp is certainly not clear-cut. 
I have tried in several ways to make the basic point, one that I have come to 
believe only recently. This point is that the lines that have been drawn between 
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the psychometric and cognitive approaches to intelligence are often arbitrary and 
even capricious. If I speak in this chapter of the contribution of cognitive psy-
chology to the psychometric tradition of mental test development, I am speaking 
of boundaries between traditions that I think have much more to do with the 
sociology of science than with its substantive concerns. 
Cognitive-Psychological Approaches to the Study of 
Mental Abilities 
How do cognitive psychologists go about studying mental abilities? Cognitive 
psychologists are highly similar in their emphasis on intensive task analysis. The 
idea is to take performance on a single task and then to study it in great depth. 
One then constructs an information-processing model of performance in the 
given task, a model that specifies in considerable detail just how subjects solve 
the task. Only after the task has been intensively analyzed is an attempt made to 
generalize the results of the task analysis to related tasks as well. 
One can carve up the field in many different ways, as people in fact have 
(Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979; Sternberg, 1977, 1981c). I have loosely classified 
these different approaches into four different categories, but it should be under-
stood that these categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive with 
respect to current research approaches in cognitive psychology. 1 now briefly 
describe what each approach is, what its goals are, what kinds of research it has 
generated, and what its implications for test construction are. 
Cognitive Correlates. In this approach to understanding mental abilities, 
subjects are tested in their ability to perform tasks that contemporary cognitive 
psychologists believe measure basic human information-processing abilities. (In-
formation processing is generally defined as the sequence of mental operations 
and their products involved in performing a cognitive task .) Such tasks include, 
among others, the Posner and Mitchell (1967) letter-matching task, in which 
subjects are asked to state as quickly as possible whether the letters in a pair such 
as "A a" constitute a physical match (which they don't) or (in another condition) 
a name match (which they do), and the S. Sternberg (1969) memory-scanning 
task, in which subjects are asked to state as quickly as possible whether a target 
digit or letter, such as 5, appeared in a previously memorized set of digits or 
letters, such as 3 6 5 2. Individuals are usually tested either via tachistoscope (a 
machine that provides rapid stimulus exposures) or via a computer terminal, with 
the principal dependent measure of interest being response time. 
The proximal goal in this research is to estimate parameters (characteristic 
quantities) representing the durations of performance for the information-pro-
cessing components constituting each task and then to investigate the extent to 
which these components correlate across subjects with each other and with scores 
on measures commonly believed to assess intelligence (e.g., Raven's Progres-
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sive Matrices test) . Most commonly, correlations between parameter estimates 
and measured intelligence are statistically significant but moderately low- usu-
ally around .3 (Hunt, Frost, & Lunneborg, 1973; Hunt , Lunneborg, & Lewis, 
1975). The distal goal of cognitive-correlates research is to integrate individual-
differences research and mainstream cognitive- psychological research- in par-
ticular, by providing a theoretical grounding from cognitive psychology for 
differential research (Hunt et al., 1973). Thus, instead of trying to draw theoreti-
cal conclusions by correlating scores on one empirically derived test (e .g., rea-
soning) with scores on another empirically derived test (e.g., vocabulary), as 
differential researchers have done, cognitive-correlates researchers draw the-
oretical conclusions by correlating scores on an empirically derived test with 
parameters generated by a cognitive model of some aspect of mental functioning 
(e.g., memory scanning) . 
Cognitive-correlates researchers would be most likely to supplement psycho-
metric tests with information-processing tests based on standard laboratory infor-
mation-processing tasks such as the memory-scanning and letter-matching tests 
mentioned earlier. Rose (1978) has actually constructed and tested an informa-
tion-processing assessment battery based on standard laboratory tasks. Using this 
battery , one can isolate latency scores for a variety of different information-
process ing components. Rose's battery is an impressive one, although correla-
tions across tasks are relatively low , and correlations of the information-process-
ing tasks and parameters with psychometric tests or various types of real-world 
performance have yet to be reported . 
Cognitive Components. In this approach to understanding mental abilities, 
subjects are tested for their ability to perform tasks of the kinds actually found on 
standard psychometric tests of mental abilities-for example, analogies, series 
completions , mental rotations, and syllogisms. Subjects are usually tested via a 
tachistoscope or a computer terminal, and response time is usually the principal 
dependent variable , with error rate and pattern of response choices as secondary 
dependent variables. These latter dependent variables are of more interest in this 
approach than in the cognitive-correlates approach because the tasks tend to be 
more difficult and thus more susceptible to erroneous responses. 
The proximal goal in this research is first to formulate a model of information 
processing in performance on IQ-test types of tasks; second , to test the model at 
the same time as parameters for the model are estimated; and, finally, to investi-
gate the extent to which these components correlate across subjects with each 
other and with scores on standard psychometric tests . Because the tasks that are 
analyzed are usually taken directly from IQ tests, or else are very similar to tasks 
found on IQ tests, the major issue in this kind of research is not whether there is 
any correlation at all between cognitive task and psychometric test scores. 
Rather, the issue is one of isolating the locus or loci of the correlation that is 
obtained . One seeks to discover what components of information processing in 
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task performance are the critical ones from the standpoint of the theory of 
intelligence. 
Cognitive-components researchers would be most likely to supplement psy-
chometric tests with information-processing tests based on the psychometric 
ones, but with test items administered in a computer-controlled setting that 
would enable the examiner to decompose test performance into its information-
processing constituents. An information-processing analysis of a subject's induc-
tive reasoning performance, for example, would assess skills such as the indi-
vidual's ability: (I) to encode stimuli; (2) to infer relations between stimulus 
terms; (3) to map higher-order relations between relations; (4) to apply pre-
viously inferred relations to new settings; (5) to compare alternative answer 
options in terms of their similarities and differences; (6) to justify one answer as 
preferred but not necessarily ideal; (7) to respond; (8) to combine these compo-
nents into a strategy that results in efficient item solution; and (9) to represent 
information in a way that facilitates operations on the data base stored in long-
term memory (Sternberg & Gardner, 1982) . 
Cognitive Training . This approach to understanding mental abilities can be 
used in conjunction with either the cognitive-correlates approach or the cogni-
tive-components approach, or in conjunction with some other approach. The 
essense of this approach is aptly described by Campione, Brown, and Ferrara 
(1982). Essentially, the approach seeks to infer the identities of cognitive pro-
cesses through an analysis of effects of training. The cognitive-training approach 
has been used widely in a variety of domains. For example, Belmont and Butter-
field (1971), Borkowski and Wanschura (1974), and Campione and Brown 
(1978) have used the approach in investigations of learning and memory. Feuer-
stein (1979), Holzman, Glaser, and Pellegrino (1976), and Linn (1973) have 
used it in investigations of reasoning and problem solving. One conclusion has 
emerged with striking regularity in many studies by many different investigators: 
To attain both durability and generalizability of training, it seems to be necessary 
to train both at the level of metacomponents (or executive processes) and at the 
level of performance components (or lower-order p.ocesses used to carry out the 
orders of the executive processes- see, e.g., Belmont, Butterfield, & Ferretti, 
1982; Feuerstein, 1979, 1980). 
Cognitive-training researchers might follow any of a number of paths to 
testing depending on their choice of what to train and how to train it. One of the 
more interesting approaches to testing among such investigators is that of Feuer-
stein (1979), who has devised a "learning potential assessment device" that he 
believes measures cognitive modifiability, or what Vygotsky (1978) referred to 
as the "zone of potential development." Modifiability is assessed by giving 
examinees guided instruction in solving problems that the examinees are initially 
unable to solve and by evaluating the examinees' ability to profit from in-
struction. 
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Cognitive Contents. Recently, a new approach to research has emerged on 
the cognitive- psychological scene that has yet to be applied directly to the study 
of mental abilities but that seems to provide a good entree into such research. The 
approach seeks to compare the performances of experts and novices in complex 
tasks such as the solution of physics problems (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981 ; 
Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Larkin , McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a, 
1980b), the selection of moves and strategies in chess and other games (Chase & 
Simon, 1973 ; DeGroot , 1965; Reitman, 1976), and the acquisition of domain-
related information by groups of people at different levels of expertise (Chiesi, 
Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979). Research on 
expert-novice differences in a variety of task domains suggests that the way 
information is stored in and retrieved from long-term memory can largely ac-
count for the substantial differences in performance between experts and nov-
ices. This view would suggest that a possible locus of differences between more 
and less mentally able people is in their ability to organize information in long-
term memory in a way that makes it readily accessible for a variety of purposes 
(Egan & Greeno, 1973). Presumably , information stored in such a flexible way 
is maximally available for transfer from old to new problem situations. 
Because the cognitive-contents approach has not yet been directly applied to 
the investigation of differences in mental abilities, it is impossible to evaluate its 
utility for purposes of such investigation. But the approach seems to supply a 
valuable new inroad for mental-abilities research, and I expect it will be only a 
matter of time before it is used for this purpose. 
Cognitive-contents researchers might supplement psychometric tests with 
complex-learning or problem-solving tasks that elicit an examinee's knowledge 
base and the way in which knowledge is mentally represented . Such researchers 
would be particularly interested in the features of problems to which examinees 
attend. It has been found, for example, that less skilled physics problem solvers 
tend to pay more attention to surface features of physics problems, whereas more 
skilled problem solvers tend to pay more attention to deep structural features 
(Chi et aI., 1981, 1982). Cognitive-contents tests might also supplement cogni-
tive-components tests, with the former assessing knowledge deficiencies and the 
latter assessing processing deficiencies. 
Cognitive psychologists studying mental abilities differ markedly in the tasks 
they have chosen to study, in the dependent variables they use to study these 
tasks, in the kinds of theories that motivate their research, and in their concern 
with individual differences. Because I have more to offer later about differences 
in task content, I pass over this source of differences now. The kinds of depen-
dent variables that cognitive psychologists use include reaction time, percentage 
correct, breakdown of response choices, protocol analysis, and output of com-
puter simulations. Although choice of one (or more) dependent variable(s) may 
not seem like a major issue to many psychologists, the history of cognitive 
psychology up to the present has been marked by active (and at times explosive) 
46 STERNBERG 
debates regarding the relative merits of various dependent measures (see, e.g., 
Ericsson & Simon , 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Pachella, 1974; Sternberg, 
1977 ; S. Sternberg, 1969). Cognitive psychologists also differ in the scope of the 
theories that motivate their research, with scope ranging from quite narrow 
(Egan, 1976) to very broad (Anderson, 1976) . The optimal scope of a motivating 
theory of intelligence has also been a subject of intense debate among cognitive 
psychologists (Anderson, 1976; Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). Finally, cogni-
tive psychologists differ greatly in their concern with individual differences. In 
the past decade, cognitive psychologists have progressed from little or no con-
cern to an increasingly broad concern with this issue. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST 
CONSTRUCTION 
Cognitive psychologists studying mental abilities have investigated a wide range 
of tasks, some of which have been used in test construction. The tasks they have 
investigated differ in a multitude of ways, but it is convenient and, I believe, 
accurate to array them along a single dimension of task complexity , from simple 
and choice reaction time at one extreme to complex logic and mathematics at the 
other extreme. The tasks along this continuum differ in the apparent" level" of 
mental processing required . 
At the simple end of the continuum, Furneaux (1956), Jensen (1979), and 
Lunneborg (1977) have used simple and choice reaction time tasks to test the 
hypothesis that individual differences in mental abi lity can be understood largely 
in terms of individual differences in sheer speed of mental functioning . Hunt 
(1978; Hunt et aI. , 1975) has studied mental speed as well but at a somewhat 
higher level of processing. He has suggested that individual differences in mental 
abilities, especially verbal ones , can be understood in terms of differences in 
people 's speed of access to lexical information in long-term memory. In sharp 
contrast to Furneaux, Jensen, and Lunneborg, he has preferred to hold constant 
simple or choice reaction time divorced from lexical access so as not to confound 
his measurement of access speed . Pellegrino and Glaser (1979, 1980) , Snow 
(1979), and I (Sternberg, 1977, 1980c, 198Ic), among others, have claimed that 
the level of mental processing studied by Hunt and his colleagues is sti ll low and 
have preferred instead to study performance on tasks at a level of complexity 
equal to that of intelligence-test items . Like those cited earlier, these researchers 
have emphasized speed of processing, but particularly speed in solving relatively 
complex tasks such as analogies and syllogisms. Finall y, investigators such as 
Greeno (1980); Chi et al. (1982); and Larkin (1981) have suggested, if only by 
implication , that even the intelligence-test items are at too Iowa level of process-
ing and have studied instead performance in very complex mathematics and 
physics problems . 
In sum, the range of tasks studied by cognitive psychologists investigating 
intelligence is at least as broad as that studied by psychometricians. Indeed, the 
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range in levels of complexity is probably greater: Whereas most psychometri-
cians seem to have resolved the Galton- Binet dispute regarding test content to 
their satisfaction, cognitive psychologists seem not to have done so. 
Even if cognitive psychologists did display more agreement regarding the 
kinds of task performance that should be studied under the rubric of intelligence, 
it is not at all clear that they would have much to contribute to psychometricians 
by way of useful feedback regarding test content, because when cognitive psy-
chologists have used reference measures at all for external criteria for their tasks 
and theories, they have used intelligence tests and subtests rather than the behav-
iors these tests were themselves intended to predict (such as school grades and 
job success). Their use of psychometric tests as (obviously proximal) criteria for 
their own tasks and tests has made it impossible to use their data to modify the 
tests . One can use the criteria to suggest changes in the predictor but not the other 
way around! 
My message regarding the contribution of cognitive psychology to selection 
of test content is not a wholly pessimistic one, however. Some recent cognitive 
research has suggested promising lines of endeavor that I believe are now ready 
for at least pilot attempts in psychometric tests. I think three suggestions are 
clearly forthcoming, albeit from experiments using IQ-test items as criteria. 
First, there is good evidence that performance on the Clark and Chase (1972) 
sentence-picture verification task, which requires the examinee rapidly to indi-
cate whether a sentence representation (such as "The star is above the plus.") 
agrees with a pictorial representation (such as : ), can provide a quick estimate 
of a person's general level of intelligence (Hunt et at., 1975) and even, possibly, 
of their proclivity for verbal versus spatial strategies for problem solving (Mac-
Leod , Hunt, & Mathews , 1978; Mathews, Hunt, & MacLeod, 1980). The task is 
easy to adnlinister and usable for examinees over a wide range of ages, ability 
levels , and mental conditions. 
Second, there is strong evidence to suggest value in measuring fluid intel-
ligence by using novel tasks employing novel kinds of concepts (Snow , 1980; 
Sternberg, 1981 a). The important thing appears to be not the particular task or 
concepts used but their relative novelty for the examinees performing them . By 
novelty, I refer not only to a difference in content but to a difference in kind from 
conventional kinds of test items . 
Third, substantial evidence has now been accumulated for the considerable 
value in measuring crystallized, or verbal, intelligence of a task requiring exam-
inees to learn and then define previously unfamiliar words presented in natural 
written contexts (Sternberg, Powell, & Kaye, 1982) . Such a task appears to tap 
at least one major aspect of the antecedents of developed individual differences 
in verbal skills and knowledge. 
To conclude this section, cognitive psychology has probably not been at its 
best in suggesting to test developers the kinds of content they might profitably 
use in test construction . There is almost no resolution among cognitive psychol-
ogists as to what kinds of test contents best measure intellectual functioning, and 
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experiments have not been designed in ways that would be particularly informa-
tive with regard to suggested content even if cognitive psychologists could agree 
as to what kinds of contents to employ . Nevertheless, a few suggestions have 
emerged from cognitive research regarding several kinds of contents that might 
be beneficially employed in future testing. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST VALIDATION 
Whereas cognitive psychology has probably made its weakest contribution to test 
development in the realm of test content, it has probably made its strongest 
contribution in the realm of test validation and , in particular, construct valida-
tion. There is perhaps some irony in the fact that the paradigm that was perhaps 
hoped by some to provide a replacement for the psychometric paradigm has 
instead provided converging evidence to support its major findings. Let me 
elaborate . 
Whereas psychometricians have generally attempted to understand mental 
abilities through the construct of the "factor," cognitive psychologists have 
generally attempted to understand mental abi lities through the construct of the 
"process" and, to a lesser extent , the " mental representation" of information. 
Through successive refinements, cognitive psychologists have developed tech-
niques that seem to be quite successful in the isolation of mental processes 
(Ericsson & Simon , 1980; Newell & Simon , 1972; Pachella, 1974; Siegler, 
1976; Sternberg, 1977; S. Sternberg, 1969) . A few of the cognitive psychol-
ogists, such as Carroll (1976 , 1981) and myself (Sternberg , 1980a) , have ex-
plicitly addressed the question of the extent to which the structural factors of 
psychometric ians deal, at some deep level, with the same latent abilities as the 
processes of cognitive psychologists. We have concluded that both sets of inves-
tigators are, in fact, looking at the same underlying entities, albeit in different 
ways. 
I disagree with Carroll's (1981) position that factors are in some interesting 
sense more " basic" than are processes, and I also disagree with my own earlier 
position (Sternberg, 1977) that processes are in some interesting sense more 
basic than factors. So far as I can tell , there ex ists no empirical means to 
determine which is more basic, nor is it even clear what, conceptually , " more 
basic" means. If there is some basic molar unit in terms of which mental abilities 
are organized, we probably do not know what it is; even more discouraging, 
perhaps, we wouldn't know we knew if we did , in fact, know . At this point, 
therefore, I regard arguments regarding basic-level mental units as nonfruitful 
and believe we should probably be quite pleased that constructs from the psycho-
metric and cognitive, as well as from other approaches (Sternberg, 1981b) , have 
converged as well as they have in suggesting how mental abilities might be 
organized . 
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What, exactly, are these points of convergence? I believe there are three main 
ones . 
First , there appears to be some (i f you wish, higher-order) general factor or 
source of individual differences that is common to performance on a strikingly 
wide range of cognitive tasks (Holzinger, 1938; Jensen, 1980; Spearman, 1927; 
Thurstone, 1938; Vernon , 197 1). Individual differences in this general ability , or 
g, appear to derive in large part from differences in the functioning of (higher-
order) executive processes- such as solution planning, monitoring, and con-
trol- that regulate most mental functions (Butterfield & Belmont , 1977; Cam-
pione & Brown , 1978; Snow , 1979; Sternberg , 1979) . 
Second , there appear to be at least two, and possibly several more , broad 
constellations of skills that operate in fairly broad ranges of tasks but not, by any 
means, in all tasks. The two most prominent constellations, which have been 
referred to by many names but here will be referred to by the names of " fluid " 
and "crystalli zed" abilities (Horn & Cattell , 1966), encompass reasoning kinds 
of tasks on the one hand and verbal kinds of tasks on the other (Cattell , 197 1; 
Horn , 1968; Vernon, 197 1) . Individual differences in these abi lities appear to be 
traceable to present and past functioning of lower-order performance and learn-
ing processes, as well as to the interactions of these processes with the higher-
order executive ones (S ternberg, 1980c) . 
Finally, for however they may interact , it is important to separate speed from 
power aspects of performance (Carroll , 198 1; Egan, 1976; Guyote & Sternberg, 
198 1; Sternberg, 1977 , 1980b). Speed and power appear to be di fferentiable 
aspects of mental skill , and confounding them can lead to misleading or even 
downright incorrect conclusions (Sternberg, 1980b). 
To conclude this section, I would argue that cognitive psychology has pro-
vided a valuable complementary way of investigating pretty much the same 
constructs psychometricians have been studying all along . The contribution of 
cognitive psychology goes beyond a merely salutary or congratulatory one. 
Cognitive psychology has provided insights into the processes underlying the 
products studied by psychometricians and has told us what happens in real time 
to generate these products. The process models of cognitive psychologists, and 
the theoretical and metatheoretical schemes underlying them, have provided 
important insights into mental abilities that previously had been lack ing. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, TEST SCORING, AND TEST 
INTERPRETATION 
Using a cognitive approach, one would deri ve and interpret a set of test scores 
quite different from that derived and interpreted via a psychometric approach. 
The major di fference in scoring would be the isolation, in cognitive analysis , of 
subscores based on processes rather than actual or alleged factors . 
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Consider, for example, the rather global construct of reasoning ability . It 
would not be at all surprising to discover that individuals believed , for one reason 
or another, to be of low intelligence score below the average on tests of reasoning 
ability. But exactly what does this tell us? Does it tell us what it is that leads to 
the subject's low intelligence? Does it tell us what kinds of interventions might 
be indicated to increase the individual's level of intellectual funct ioning? Does it 
even tell us that the individual is low in reasoning ability as opposed, say, to 
encoding the terms of the problem so that the reasoning operations can be 
performed? I would argue that the answer to each of these questions is negative; 
in short, that the low score in reasoning provides relatively little by way of 
diagnostic or prescriptive information. 
A cognitive analysis of the bases of performance on one or more reasoning 
tests would seek to go "inside" the reasoning factor-to elicit for each indi-
vidual a measure of performance on each of the processes theorized in combina-
tion to constitute reasoning performance . In my own theory of inductive reason-
ing, for example (Sternberg, 1977, 1980c), separate component scores might be 
estimated for processes such as encoding, inference , application, and response . 
Other cognitive theories would yield somewhat different sets of process scores, 
just as alternative factorial theories yield somewhat different sets of factor 
scores. At the very least, any of the "reasonable" theories of cognitive process-
ing would permit a separation between performance on the encoding, pure rea-
soning, and response aspects of task performance. 
These process scores not only permit a finer diagnosis of strengths and weak-
nesses in congitive skills but permit as well the construction of a process-based 
training program . It is difficult to conceive of training something as ill-defined as 
"reasoning" but relatively easy to conceive of training a specific skill such as 
inferring relations. The relative ease of conceiving and actually of preparing such 
a training program should not, however, desensitize one to the considerable 
difficulty that can be involved in instantiating transfer of training in the indi-
viduals exposed to the program of instruction . 
The theoretical basis now exists not only for analyzing processing skills in 
reasoning tasks but for analyzing processing skills in other kinds of tasks as well , 
such as spatial, verbal, and numerical tasks. Yet, I do not recommend our 
actually implementing the theory in practice at this time . There are several 
reasons for my reluctance to what I view as premature implementation. 
First, obtaining reliable estimates of process scores for individuals requires 
very lengthy testing , usually via a computer terminal or comparable device . 
Thus, the technology does not yet exist for implementing theory in an expedi-
tious way. We need much more research aimed simply at enabling efficient 
measurement of process parameters of test performance. 
Second, the differential validity of process scores in predicting interesting 
criterion performances has yet to be demonstrated . At present, such differential 
validity is available as a promissory note rather than as a demonstrated accom-
plishment. 
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Third, although we have the means for isolating lower-order processes of 
performance (i.e., those processes used in strategy implementation), we do not 
yet have adequate means for isolating higher-order executive processes (i .e., 
those processes used in strategy planning, monitoring, and control). Yet, these 
latter processes are the ones I believe most crucial to understanding the bases of 
individual differences in intelligence. Until we have a feasible technology for 
isolating these more interesting processes, I am reluctant to advocate rapid im-
plementation of process analysis in mental-ability testing . 
To conclude this section, I believe we now have a theoretical basis for the 
scoring and interpretation of ability tests but that the practical basis has lagged 
behind. In some ways, this situation is a welcome contrast to what has been the 
typical one in abilities research, where theory has tended to lag behind practice. I 
believe that process analysis will eventually become both feasible and desirable 
in the scoring and interpretation of ability tests; the time has not yet come. 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND TEST MODIFICATION 
What are the implications of the previous discussion for the modification of 
ability tests? The answer depends on the time frame into which one puts it. At 
present , I think they are modest. None of the cognitive research that has been 
done has come up with any alternative test that is clearly better than the best of 
the ability tests we now have . But there have been interlaced throughout this 
discussion a number of promising notes that I would like to summarize here, 
because I believe they will, eventually, result in test modification. First, with 
regard to test content, I feel the research to date suggests the importance of using 
measurements based upon performance on novel tasks comprising novel task 
content. Second , with regard to construct validation , I think cognitive research 
has shown that current tests can be understood in terms of their measurement of 
process constructs. Third , with regard to test scoring and interpretation, I believe 
it will eventually be possible to measure executive and performance processes in 
technically feasible ways and that such measurements will provide new bases for 
diagnosis and training that are currently unavailable. Finally, I feel that cognitive 
psychology will continue to provide a basis for the questioning of some of our 
assumptions regarding the nature of mental abilities and how they can be 
measured . 
Let me give three specific examples of some dubious assumptions regarding 
the nature of mental abilities that are entrenched in mental testing , and let me 
show how these assumptions are being added into question by information-
processing research. 
Dubious Assumption I . To be smart is to be fast. The assumption that 
"smart is fast " permeates our entire society. When we refer to someone as 
"quick," we are endowing them with one of the primary attributes of what we 
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perceive an intelligent person to be. Indeed , in a recent study of people ' s concep-
tions of intelligence, when we asked people to list behav iors characteri stic of 
intelligent persons, behaviors such as " learns rapidly," "acts quickly," " talks 
quickly," and " makes judgments quickly" were commonly listed (Sternberg , 
Conway , Ketron, & Bernstein , 198 1). It is not onl y the man in the street who 
believes that speed is assoc iated with intellect: Several prominent contemporary 
theori sts of intelligence base their theories in large part upon individual dif-
ferences in the speed with which people process information (Hunt , 1978; 
Jensen, 1979). 
The assumption that more intelligent people are rapid in formation processors 
also underlies the overwhelming majority of tests , including creativity as well as 
intelligence tests . It is rare to find a test that is not timed or a timed test that 
virtually all examinees are able to finish by working at a comfortable rate of 
problem solving. I would argue that thi s assumption is a gross overgeneraliza-
tion: It is true for some people and for some mental operations but not for all 
people or all mental operations . Blind , across-the-board acceptance of the as-
sumption is not only unjustifi ed- it is wrong. 
Almost everyone knows people who , although often slow in performing 
tasks, perform the tasks at a superior level of accomplishment. Moreover , we all 
know that snap judgments are often poor ones . Indeed , in our study of people's 
conceptions of intelligence, " does not make snap judgments" was listed as an 
important attribute of intelligent performance. Evidence for the dubiousness of 
the " smart is fast" assumption extends, however, beyond intuition and everyday 
observation. A number of findings from carefull y conducted psychological re-
search undermine the validity of assumption. I will cite four such findings, which 
are only examples from a wider literature on the subject. 
First , it is well known that , in general, a reflective rather than an impulsive 
style in problem solving tends to be associated with more intelligent problem-
solving performance (see Baron , 198 1, 1982, for reviews of thi s literature). 
Jumping into problems without adequate reflection is likely to lead to fa lse starts 
and erroneous conclusions . Yet , timed tests often force the examinee to solve 
problems impulsively . It is often claimed that the strict timing of such tests 
merely mirrors the requirements of our highl y pressured and productive society. 
But ask yourself how many signi ficant problems you encounter in your work or 
personal li fe that allow no more than the 15 to 60 seconds allowed for a typical 
test problem on a standardi zed test; you will probably be hard pressed to think of 
any such problems. 
Second , in a study of the role of planning behavior in problem solving, it has 
been found that more intelligent persons tend to spend relatively more time than 
do less intelligent persons on global (higher-order, up-front) planning and rela-
tively less time on local (problem-specific, lower-level) planning. In contrast, 
less intelligent persons show the reverse pattern , emphasizing loca l rather than 
global planning (relative to the more intelligent persons) (Sternberg, 198 1 a). The 
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point is that what matters is not total time spent but distribution of this time 
across the various kinds of planning one can do . 
Third, in studies of reasoning behavior in children and adults, it has been 
found that although greater intelligence is associated with more rapid execution 
of most components of information processing, problem encoding is a notable 
exception to this trend. The more intelligent individuals tend to spend relatively 
more time encoding the terms of the problem, presumably to facilitate subse-
quent operations on these encodings (Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser, 1980; 
Sternberg, 1977 ; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979) . Similar outcomes have been ob-
served in comparisons of expert versus novice problem solvers confronted with 
difficult physics problems (Chi et aI. , 1982). 
Finally , in a study of people's performance in solving insight problems (arith-
metical and logical problems whose difficulty resided in the need for a nonob-
vious insight for problem solution rather than in the need for ari thmetical or 
logical knowledge), a correlation of .75 was found between the amount of time 
people spent on the problems and measured IQ. The correlation between time 
spent and score on the insight problems was .62 (Sternberg & Davidson, 1982). 
Note that, in these problems, individuals were free to spend as long as they liked 
so lving the problems. Persistence and involvement in the problems was highly 
correlated with success in solution : The more able individuals did not give up; 
nor did they fall for the obvious, but often incorrect, solutions. 
The point of these examples is simple: Sometimes speed is desirable; some-
times it is not. Whether it is desirable or not depends on the task, the particular 
components of information processing involved in solution of the task, and, most 
likely , the person's style of problem solving. Blind imposition of a strict time 
limit for a test, or even a not-so-strict one, is theoretically indefensible and 
practically self-defeating . 
Dubious Assumption 2. Intelligence is last year's achievement. At first 
glance, this would appear to be an assumption few people would accept. Indeed, 
doesn't almost everyone make a clear distinction between intelligence and 
achievement? But if one examines the content of the major intelligence tests, one 
will find that they measure intelligence as last year's (or the year before's, or the 
year before that 's) achievement. What is an intelligence test for children of a 
given age would be an achievement test for children a few years younger. In 
some test items, like vocabulary, the achievement component is obvious. In 
others , it is more disguised, for example, verbal analogies or arithmetic prob-
lems. But virtually all tests commonly used for the assessment of intelligence 
place heavy achievement demands on the students tested. 
The achievement-testing orientation exhibited in intelligence tests may be 
acceptable and even appropriate when the tests are administered to children who 
have had full y adequate educational opportunities in reasonably adequate social 
and emotional environments . But for children whose environments have been 
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characterized by deprivation of one kind or another, the orientation may lead to 
invalid test results . There is no fully adequate solution to the problem of identifi -
cation of the gifted among such youngsters, especially if the youngsters will have 
to function in the normal sociocultural milieu . A common solution to the prob-
lem, exclusive use of nonverbal tests, is almost certainly an inadequate so lution : 
First, one is measuring only a subset of important intellectual skills; second , and 
perhaps more importantly , nonverbal tests actually show , on the average, greater 
differences in scores across sociocultural groups than do verbal ones (Jensen , 
1980; Lesser, Fifer , & Clark , 1965). An alternative solution to the problem is to 
ask what abilities one is really interested in measuring by the achievement-
saturated tests and then to attempt to measure these abilities more directly and in 
ways that reduce the achievement load. This is the path we have followed. 
Consider two examples. 
Consider first one of the most common types of items on intelligence tests-
vocabulary. It is well known that vocabulary is one of the best predictors, if not 
the best single predictor, of overall IQ score (Jensen, 1980; Matarazzo, 1972). 
Yet, few tests have higher achievement load than does vocabulary. Can one 
measure the latent ability tapped by vocabulary tests without presenting children 
with what is essentially an achievement test? I believe one can. 
There is reason to believe that vocabulary is such a good measure of intel-
ligence because it measures, albeit indirectly , children's ability to acq uire infor-
mation in context (Jensen, 1980; Sternberg, Powell, & Kaye, 1982, 1983; 
Werner & Kaplan, 1952). Most vocabulary is learned in everyday contexts rather 
than through direct instruction . Thus, new words are usually encountered for the 
first time (and subsequently) in textbooks, novels, newspapers, lectures, and the 
like. More intelligent people are better able to use surrounding context to figure 
out the words' meanings. As the years go by, the better decontextualizers acquire 
the larger vocabularies. Because so much of one's learning (including learning 
other than vocabulary) is contextually determined , the ability to use context to 
add to one's knowledge base is an important skill in intelligent behavior. Is there 
any way of measuring this skill directly rather than relying on indirect measure-
ment (vocabulary testing) that involves a heavy achievement load? We have 
attempted to measure this skill directly by presenting children with paragraphs 
written at a level well below their grade level. Embedded in the paragraphs are 
one or more unknown words. The children 's task is to use the surrounding 
context to figure out the meanings of the unknown words . Note that , in this 
testing paradigm, differential effects of past achievement are reduced by using 
reading passages that are easy for everyone but target vocabulary words that are 
unknown to everyone. We have found that quality of children's definitions of the 
unknown words is highly correlated with overall verbal intelligence, reading 
comprehension, and vocabulary test scores (about .6 in each case). Thus, one 
can measure an important aspect of intelligence directly and without heavy 
reliance on achievement rather than indirectly and with heavy reliance on past 
achievement. 
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Consider second another common type of intelligence test-arithmetic word 
problems (and at higher levels, algebra and geometry word problems as well). 
Again, performance on such problems is heavily dependent on one's mathemati-
cal achievements and , indeed, opportunities. Can one measure the main ski ll s 
tapped by such tests without creating what is essentially an achievement test? We 
believe we have done so through the insight problems mentioned earlier. Consid-
er two typical examples of such problems: 
I . If you have black socks and brown socks in your drawer, mixed in the ratio 
of 4 to 5, how many socks will you have to take out to make sure of having a pair 
the same color? 
2. Water lilies double in area every 24 hours. At the beginning of the summer 
there is one water lily on a lake. It takes 60 days for the lake to become covered 
with water lilies . On what day is the lake half-covered? 
Solutions of problems such as these requires a fair amount of insight but very 
little in the way of prior mathematical knowledge. In most problems such as 
these, a common element in successful solution is selective encoding- knowing 
what elements of the problem are relevant to solution and what aspects are 
ilTelevant. Performance on such problems is correlated .66 with IQ. Thus , it is 
possible to use word problems that are good measures of intelligence but that 
require very little in the way of prior arithmetical knowledge (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1982) . Moreover, it is unnecessary to time problem administration. 
As mentioned earlier, higher performance is associated with more, not less , time 
spent on the problems. 
To summarize: We need not measure intelligence as last year's achievement. 
It is probably impossible to rid intelligence tests of achievement load entirely. 
Indeed, it may not even be desirable to do so. But the load can be substantiall y 
reduced by asking oneself what intellectual ski lls one wishes to measure and then 
by seeking to measure these directly through the use of items that tap the ski lls 
rather than their by-products. 
Dubious Assumption 3. Testing needs to be conducted in a stressful, anx-
iety-provoking situation. Few situations in life are as stressful as the situation 
confronting the examinee about to receive (and then receiving) a standardized 
test. Most examinees know that the results of the test are crucial for the exam-
inees' future and that I to 3 hours of testing may have more impact on the future 
than years of school performance. The anx iety generated by the testing situation 
may have little or no effect on some examinees and even a beneficial effect on 
other examinees . But there is a substantial proportion of examinees- the test 
anxious- whose anxiety will cripple their test performance, possibly severely. 
Moreover, because the anxiety will be common to standardized testing situations 
(although often not to other testing situations), the elTor in measurement resulting 
from a single testing situation will be compounded by error in measurement in 
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other testing situations. With repeated low scores, a bright but test-anxious 
individual may truly appear to be stupid. What is needed is some kind of 
standardized assessment device that is fair to the test anxious, as well as to 
others, and that does not impose a differential penalty on individuals as a func-
tion of a form of state anxiety that may have no counterpart in situations other 
than that of standardized testing. I believe that we have at least two promising 
leads in this direction. 
The first lead is testing based on the notion of intelligence as in part a function 
of a person's ability to profit from incomplete instruction (Resnick & Glaser, 
1976). A measure of this ability is now provided by Feuerstein's (1979) Learning 
Potential Assessment Device (LPAD), which although originally proposed as an 
assessment device for retarded performers, can be used for performers at varying 
levels of performance, including advanced ones . The device involves administra-
tion of problems with graded instruction. The amount of instruction given de-
pends on the examinee's needs . Moreover, the test is administered in a suppor-
tive, cooperative atmosphere, where the examiner is actually helping the 
examinee solve problems rather than impassively observing the examinee's suc-
cess or failure. The examiner does everything he or she can do to allay anxiety 
(rather than to create it!). Feuerstein has found that children who are cowed by 
and unable to perform well on regular standardized tests can demonstrate high 
levels of performance on his test. Moreover , their performance outside the test-
ing situation appears to be predicted better by the LPAD than by conventional 
intelligence tests (Feuerstein, 1979). 
The second lead is based on the notion that intelligence can be measured with 
some accuracy by the degree of resemblance between a person's behavior and the 
behavior of the "ideally" intelligent individual (Neisser, 1979). Sternberg et al. 
(1981) had a group of individuals rate the extent to which each of 250 behaviors 
characterized their own behavioral repertoire . A second group of individuals 
rated the extent to which each of the 250 behaviors characterized the behavioral 
repertoire of an "ideally intelligent" person . The investigators then computed 
the correlation between each person ' s self-description and the description of the 
ideally intelligent person (as provided by the second group of individuals). The 
correlation provided a measure of degree of resemblance between a real indi-
vidual and the ideally intelligent individual. The claim was that this degree of 
resemblance is itself a measure of intelligence. The facts bore out the claim: The 
correlation between the resemblance measure and scores on a standard lQ test 
was .52 , confirming that the measure did provide an index of intelligence as it is 
often operationally defined . And doing self-ratings involved minimal stress . 
The behaviors that were rated had previously been listed by entirely different 
individuals as characterizing either "intelligent" or "unintelligent" persons . 
The intelligent behaviors were shown (by factor analysis) to fall into three 
general classes: problem-solving ability (e.g., "reasons logically and well," 
"identifies connections among ideas," and "sees all aspects of a problem"); 
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verbal ability (e.g., "speaks clearly and articulately," "is verbally fluent ," and 
"reads with high comprehension "); and social competence (e.g., "accepts oth-
ers for what they are," "admits mistakes ," and "displays interest in the world 
at large") . (No attempt was made to classify the unintelligent behaviors, which 
were not the object of interest in the study.) 
I would not propose the behavioral checklist, or the LPAD, for that matter , as 
replacements for standard intelligence tests. Certainly, there is not enough valid-
ity information yet to make such a proposition. But I think that they deserve to be 
considered as supplements to standard tests. They are much less stress provoking 
than standard intelligence tests and may well be more accurate, at least for 
individuals who fall to pieces when confronted with standardized tests. Persons 
who scored high on these new indices but low on conventional indices would 
merit further follow-up before writing them off as weak or even average perform-
ers. Such measures carry the potential of identifying gifted individuals who are 
being lost for no reason other than their high levels of test anxiety . 
To conclude, although cognitive psychology has not yet provided (and may 
never provide) a basis for replacing existing psychometric tests , it has made and 
is continuing to make contributions that I believe will result in some important 
reconceptualizations of the nature of intelligence and its measurement. I think 
cognitive psychologists have made substantial progress toward this goal during 
the past decade, and I see no reason to believe that this progress will not 
continue. 
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